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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
CASE NO. 16027 
This case is an action by plaintiffs for damages caused by 
defendants breach of the covenant against encumbrances in a 
warranty deed. 
DISP_'2_SITI_ON IN THE LOWE~ COURT 
The district court below ruled as a matter of law that the 
creation and functioning of the Roosevelt Special Improvement 
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District created an encumbrance upon the subject properties and 
that defendants' subsequent conveyance, by warranty deed, to 
plaintiffs of their respective lots resulted in a breach of the 
covenant against encumbrances. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmation of the judgment of the court 
below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In February 1974, pursuant to the requirements set forth by 
statute, §10-16-4 et. seq., U.C.A., (1953 as amended), Roosevelt 
City gave notice of intent, and in March 1974, did create a 
Special Improvement District. The stated purpose of the District 
was for the installation of curb and gutter, plus the paving of 
certain streets within the boundaries of the district. It was 
further provided in the notice of intention that: 
the Mayor and city council will levy or cause to be 
levied, assessments on all of the property in the 
District that shall receive improvements to pay (all or 
any portion) of the improvements according to the 
benefits that will be derived to the property in the 
District. 
Subsequently, the contracts for the work were let and the 
actual work of improvement was commenced. After the contracts 
for improvements were let, but before the assessments were 
levied, the plaintiffs individually consumated the purchase of an 
improved lot, and in many cases, a house from the defendants. 
This was done during the period from December 1974 to October 
-2-
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1975. All of the conveyances by defendants, of the subject lots 
to the individual plaintiffs, were by a warranty deed, which 
contained no restrictions or reservations. At the time of 
conveyance, the improvements for the involved lots were in 
various stages of completion. In October 1976, after the 
improvements for the entire city were completed, Roosevelt City, 
pursuant to statute (U.C.A. [1953] §10-16-23) levied the costs of 
the improvements against the properties of the individual 
plaintiffs. After plaintiffs' unsuccessful request to have the 
defendants voluntarily satisfy the assessments, plaintiffs 
brought this action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CREATION OF THE SPECIAL IMPROVEMENT 
DISTRICT CREATED AN ENCUMBRANCE WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF §57-1-12, U.C.A. (1953) 
By statute, every warranty deed contains a covenant against 
liens and encumbrances. The relevant language is as follows: 
Such deed when executed as required by law shall have 
the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee 
with covenants from the grantor . that the 
premises are free from all encumbrances. (U.C.A. 1953, 
§57-1-12) 
The trial court found that the Roosevelt Improvement 
District constituted an encumbrance from the time of its 
creation. This finding is consistent with the weight of the 
authority and with the implied meaning of a warranty of title. 
-3-
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An encumbrance, within the scope of the covenant against 
encumbances, includes more than merely liens or mortgages. 
~~~ck~~ Law Di~tionary, revised fourth edition, making reference 
20 N.E. 581 and Miller v. 
Sctl_~in_r:~_r_ In~, 113 F2d 748, 72 App. D.C. 282, defines an 
encumbrance as, "Any right to, or interest in, land which may 
s11bsist in another to the diminution of its value, but consistent 
th the passing of fee." (emphasis added) (See also, Rawle, 
Cov. §75, 76, 191.) 
on Real in discussing the 
"encumbrance" states: 
..• "encumbrance" is more comprehensive than 
"lien", as it not only includes liens, but any other 
burden resting either on the real estate itself~ or on 
the-o tle thereto which tends to lessen the value or 
interferes with its free enjoyment. ( §3183, p. 274, 
emphasis added) (See also, First Church of Christ, 
Sc_i_en!cj_~ ':_:_ Cox, 4 7 Ind. App-;-536;-94- N":-E .--l048; 
Simons v. Diamond Match Co., 159 Mich. 241, 123 N.W. 
H3T;-Texas-&-p-;-R.. --co-:-- v-.-El Paso & N. E. R. co. (Tex. 
Civ. App~ l56-s~w~-s6f;- Gi-een-v. -T:ld-baiT, 26 Wash. 
3 3 8 , 6 7 p. 8 4 ) -- ----
term 
The well accepted, majority view, follows the guidelines set 
forth above, and examples of interests, rights and burdens which 
have been held to be encumbrances include: a restriction in a 
deed, l.!Y!:l_~ v. ~?J}e, 239 Mich. 357, 214 N.W. 163; building 
restrict ions , Roberts v . Le_vy, 3 Abb. Prac. ( N. S.) 311 (N.Y.); 
covenants prohibiting the sale of spirits on land, Hatcher v. 
~ndrews, 5 Bush (KY.) 561; a restrictive provision concerning the 
use of firearms, ~£9~er ':_:._ ~~!1~-~' 161 Cal. 390, 119 P. 509; an 
inchoate right of dower, ~~'t~C!_~ v. l_!_t!_~J:>ard, 97 Mass 195; and 
-4-
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even a statutory right of redemption, Roy v. F.M. Martin and Son, 
16 Ala. App. 650, 81 South 142. 
Other cases have held that it is not necessary that the 
encumbrance be specific or determinable in amount at the time of 
conveyance. In f!ark ~ f_isher, 54 Kan. 408, 38 P. 493, a lessor 
leased some propety to a lessee for the purpose of growing and 
harvesting wheat. The lease agreement provided that if the 
property were sold before the expiration of the lease, the lessee 
would still have the right to harvest the wheat. Shortly 
thereafter, the land was conveyed to a grantee who promptly 
conveyed it to a third party. The court held that the lessee's 
right to harvest the wheat was an encumbrance even though at the 
time of both conveyances, the amount of that interest, if 
anything, was not specifically determinable. (See also, Harrison 
v. Des Moines & Ft. D. R.R. Co., 91 Iowa 114, 58 N.W. 1081; 
~-escott ~Trueman, 4 Mass. 627, 3 Am. Dec. 246; Fritz ~Pusey, 
31 Minn. 368, 18 N.W. 94; Chapman ~ ~imba~, 7 Neb. 399; Carter 
v. Denman 23 N.J.L. 260; Stanbaug~ ~ ~mith, 23 Ohio St. 584; 
~-~~~~ty ~Milligan, 165 P~. 534, 30 A. 1030.) 
Situations involving special improvement assessments, which 
are similar to the present case, have also been considered by 
other courts. The Kentucky case of 0_'_~_!1~ ~ Chan9oir, 104 So. 
59 (Ky.) involved a dispute between a vendor and vendee 
concerning liability for just such an the assessment. The court 
placed the liability on the vendor, stating: 
... the vendor 
vendee contracted 
should pay 
to purchase 
-5-
for the paving. 
a lot of ground 
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on a 
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paved street. The mere fact that the street was paved 
enhanced the value of the property and, doubtless, 
influenced the vendee in negotiating for its purchase 
and in determining the price he was to pay for it. The 
vendee's situation is similar to one who contracts to 
buy an improved property, but, before the date upon 
which the deed of sale is to be executed, he discovers 
that there are outstanding but unrecorded liens for 
labor and material which affect the property and are 
certain to be recorded within the time limit prescribed 
by law. Can anyone successfully contend that, under 
these circumstances, the vendor could be legally 
absolved from satisfying the claims of these lien 
holders? 
The weight of authority has also held that if the 
improvements have already been made, an encumbrance exists by 
that reason, whether or not the assessments have been levied as a 
lien according to statutory provisions. 
148 Mass. 102, 18 N.E. 679; ~~JC.!2b_?E!: v. !!_~S;l_ll_~, 46 Mo. App. 318; 
Cadmus v. ~~_9~ I 4 7 N . J . L . 54 9 I 
supra; Green v. supra.) 
4 A. 323; ~a_Ue!_t_:t_ ~~ ~i_!_!l9_!3_12_, 
It has also been held that the 
liability upon land for improvements which had been ordered, but 
ot yet constructed and for which the assessment had not been 
levied was still an encumbrance within the meaning of the 
covenant against encumbrances. 
Mass. 423, 91 N.E. 900, the court stated: 
There was a liability which was sure to become 
absolute and enforceable against the land as soon as 
the work was completed and the expense ascertained. 
This was an incumbrance from which the petitioners were 
entitled to be protected under the covenant. 
This same court later held, 
When there is an actual liability for an 
assessment which subsequently ripens into an actual 
amount, such liability constitutes a breach of the 
covenant of the deed at the time it is delivered. 
(~~ ~~ ~_ompson, Mass. 146 N.E. 2d 657) 
-6-
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In the present case, there can bE' no question that the 
Roosevelt City Improvment District had "a right to or interest 
in" the properties which were located within the boundaries of 
the Special Improvement District, and while this interest or 
right was consistent with the record owner's title or the passing 
of that title, it nevertheless was a burden which diminished the 
value of the property. In the Notice of Intent, first published 
February 7, 1974, in the Uintah Basin Standard, the city 
indicated that: 
1. The assessments shall be levied for the purpose of 
installing-curb-and-gutter,and-bl-acktop paving, on the 
streets and pub! ic rights-of-way in Roosevelt City, 
except as specifically excluded below. 
2. That said assessments are orooosed to be levied, 
based on the actual cost of the \nstallation oT- the 
curb-and- guTter~--aOci- pav-ing, as determined by the total 
frontage of the property involved and apportioned 
between all property owners in the improvement district 
on said basis. (emphasis added) 
This intent to create and assess, later developed into an 
actual right or interest of the city to assess, when the 
Improvement District was created on March 18, 1974, since from 
that time the city was, 
... authorized ... to levy assessments upon the property 
described in the notice of intention, to pay for 
improvements to be made and the city officials of said 
city are hereby directed to proceed to construct the 
said improvements..... (See Appendix to defendants 
brief, Resolution creating ~_12ecial Impr_?vement 
Q_i_stri_<:!, -McirCFl-18~- 1974:-) __ _ 
It is to be noted, that when Roosevelt City chose to 
exercise their assessing authority is not as important as the 
-7-
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fact that from and after March 18, 1974, 
and interest" in the subject properties 
the city had a "right 
which would allow the 
city to assess the property. From any equitable point of view, 
that right to assess surely constituted an actual "encumbrance" 
to the property. 
Furthermore, shortly after the Improvement District was 
created, the contracts for the improvement work were let, and the 
actual work of improvement was commenced. All this occured prior 
to the time that any of the plaintiffs received their individual 
warranty deed from defendant. In fact, the undisputed testimony 
was that the improvements were partially or completely finished 
e~jor to the time the plaintiffs received their individual 
warranty deeds from defendants. 
Under these circumstances, the district court held that 
Roosevelt City's 
time defendant 
nevertheless an 
interest, though not assessed as a lien at the 
conveyed the properties to plaintiff, was 
encumbrance and therefore, that defendants' 
conveyances were in breach of the covenant against encumbrances. 
This is also the view of the majority opinion of jurisdictions in 
the United States, and especially true under the view espoused by 
the Massachusetts court in ~otljng and ~~9~ (supra). Plaintiffs 
respectfully submit that this view, is not only supported by the 
weight of authority, but that it is also the better reasoning. 
Plaintiffs therefore would hence urge the Utah Supreme Court to 
adopt the same. 
-8-
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POINT II 
CERTAINITY AS TO THE AMOUNT OF AN 
ENCUMBRANCE IS NOT A BAR TO THE 
EXISTENCE OF THAT ENCUMBRANCE 
Defendants contend that since the final costs of the 
improvement work were not fully ascertainable until after all the 
warranty deeds had been conveyed to plaintiffs, that no 
encumbrance could exist. However, following the rationale of the 
Clark case and others, cited above, the later ascertainment of 
the total costs for the improvements would relate back to the 
date when the city acquired its right to assess for those costs, 
that being at the time of the creation of the improvement 
district. Plaintiff acknowledges that no lien yet existed, but 
feels that there can be no serious question that an encumberance 
did then exist. 
Defendants further contend that if they are to be held 
liable for these improvements that they would perpetually be 
liable for any future improvements which might be assessed. Such 
logic both begs the question and tortures reasoning. This kind 
of reasoning overlooks the fact that the resolution creating the 
Improvement District only authorized assessments for the cost of 
certain curb, gutter and paving and the ordinance assessing those 
costs among the various property owners was in fact adopted in 
October 1976. If any other improvements should thereafter be 
made, they would have to be authorized by the city first 
publishing new intent, and thereafter creating a new district and 
finally letting new contracts. Since defendants have conveyed 
-9-
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title to the subject land, the plaintiffs or their successors, in 
interest and not defendants would be liable for any new 
assessments. Thus the question is not what might be done, but 
rather what can be done by the old district, and the fact is, it 
cannot levy any additional assessments. 
The mere fact the district had a right to levy assessments 
against the subject property, did not give the district an "open-
checking account" so to speak. The district was limited to the 
assessments it could levy, by the terms of the Notice of In tent 
and the ordinance creating the District. The assessments could 
not exceed the same. The defendants knew of the existence of 
,the Improvement District and watched its progress in installing 
curb, gutter and paving, while they sold the individual 
plaintiffs their lots. Since Notice of the Intent to create the 
District was given to all property owners, including the 
defendants, as required by law, in February 1974, the defendants 
should be presumed to know that assessments would be levied for 
the improvements and that such improvements would not be free. 
If defendants had not wanted to pay for these improvements, they 
easily could have excluded the same from each warranty deed they 
gave plaintiffs. However, they did not, and the power and right 
of the city to assess for the improvements being installed was an 
effective encumbrance against the property fcom and after March 
18, 1974. The mere fact that the amount of the assessment was 
then unknown, did not effect the validity or ex i stance of the 
same as an encumbrance. 
-10-
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS ARE FOUNDED 
IN WARRANTY NOT FAIRNESS 
Although neither pled in defendants' answer or otherwise 
tried below, defendants now contend on appeal that they sold 
"unimproved lots" to the plaintiffs and that since it was the 
properties which received the benefits, that the "fairness 
doctrine" should require that plaintiffs pay for the same. In 
this supposition, defendants have errored. 
First, plaintiffs did not negotiate for the purchase of 
unimproved lots. The decision of the district court, supported 
further by various loan documents executed by the defendants, 
would urge the opposite. (These documents are in the Exhibits of 
or for each of the individual plaintiffs and is identified as 
Farm Home Document No. 422-8, and is titled "Property Information 
and Appraisal," which document was prepared by defendants or 
their agent, and details the improvements included with the lots 
being sold. It is to be noted that in most instances, defendants 
represented that the lot had curb, gutter ·and pavement.) 
Second, and notwithstanding the above, it is to be noted 
that plaintiffs' rights are founded in warranty and are not based 
on what might or might not be found to be fair. However, under 
all equitable standards, fairness should require defendants to 
pay for the improvements they represented to the lending 
institution were included with the property. Though the question 
of liability for the costs of the improvements may or may not 
-11-
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have been discussed by the parties, the fact is, that at all 
times plaintiffs believed they were contracting to purchase 
improved lots. If the fairness doctrine is applied to these 
correctly stated facts, plaintiffs contend that the only 
reasonable conclusion is that which was reached by the Kentucky 
Court in ~Sh~, supra, namely that the improvement district did 
constitute an encumbrance against the subject lots, at the time 
of conveyance. Thus the decision of the trial court must be 
affirmed. 
Plaintiffs submit that the trial court's decision, which is 
consistent with the greater weight of authority, is the 
appropriate and better reasoned view which Utah should follow. 
Hence plaintiffs urge this honorable court to affirm the trial 
court's decision. 
SUMMARY 
It is a well accepted principle of Utah law that a warranty 
deed includes a covenant that the conveyed property is free and 
clear of all encumbrances, unless ~2-~~ssly ~~~~p~~ in th~ deed 
itself. While there are no known Utah guidelines (case law or 
otherwise) which clearly define an encumbrance, that question has 
been considered by other jurisdictions, and plaintiffs urges this 
court to adopt and follow the majority of the same. 
Plaintiffs do not claim that a levied or amount certain lien 
formed the basis for their claim of breach or warranty. Rather, 
plaintiffs assert that the concept of encumbrances, as defined by 
-12-
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